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STANDING A CHANCE: DOES SPOKEO PRECLUDE CLAIMS 
ALLEGING THE VIOLATION OF CERTAIN STATE DATA 
BREACH LAWS? 
Taryn Elliott 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American standing jurisprudence, which determines what cases may be 
brought in federal court, arises from the “case or controversy” requirement 
of the United States Constitution.1  As the Supreme Court has interpreted it, 
this provision prohibits Article III courts from hearing lawsuits unless the 
issue raises and alleges a sufficient injury-in-fact, establishes causation, and 
allows for redressability by the court.2 
The question of whether Congress can define “injury-in-fact,” and 
therefore confer standing via statutory language, has been the subject of 
much inquiry and debate throughout the years, as legislatures have 
increasingly included so-called “citizen suit” or “private right of action” 
provisions in enacted laws to allow individuals to bring suit.3  The recent 
Supreme Court decision in Spokeo v. Robins is perceived to have cut away 
at the validity of certain federal statutory provisions that allow individuals to 
bring suit when their sole claims are that the statute was violated.4  In the 
Spokeo case, the Court assessed a plaintiff’s standing to sue based on a 
violation of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and held that “a 
bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm” does not satisfy 
the injury-in-fact requirement.5 
 
 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Rutgers University. 
 1  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 2  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 3  Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) (discussing the view that prior to Lujan, the 
unanimous view of the lower courts had been that a legislative grant of citizen standing was 
constitutional, even without a showing of injury-in-fact). 
 4  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016); Francis X. Riley III, What You Should 
Know About “Standing” Since Spokeo, INSIDEARM (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.insidearm.com/news/00043021-what-you-should-know-about-standing-spoke/. 
 5  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
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In the wake of the 2016 Spokeo decision, courts have analyzed standing 
in the context of alleged federal statutory violations differently, depending 
on which laws the plaintiffs claim have been violated.6  It is also unclear if 
and how Spokeo will impact class action lawsuits brought based on state law 
claims, and since certain federal courts in recent years have certified 
nationwide classes under the law of a single state, this question may have 
major implications for individuals alleging state statutory violations in a 
national class action suit.7 
One area where federal courts may soon determine congressional 
authority to define injuries concerns the increasingly pervasive issue of data 
breaches.  In recent years, the United States has seen a number of high-
profile breaches, which are often defined as incidents “in which sensitive, 
protected, or confidential data has potentially been viewed, stolen, or used 
by an individual unauthorized to do so.  Data breaches may involve payment 
card information (PCI), personal health information (PHI), personally 
identifiable information (PII), trade secrets, or intellectual property.”8  
Among the most recent and highest-impact instances are the 2013 Target 
breach, in which 40 million credit and debit card accounts, as well as data on 
70 million customers were compromised;9 the 2014 Home Depot breach, 
where 56 million credit card accounts and 53 million email addresses were 
stolen;10 and the 2015 Anthem data breach, in which 80 million patient and 
employee records were obtained.11  Arguably, however, the most concerning 
data breach took place in 2017, when the personal information, including 
Social Security numbers and addresses, of up to 143 million Americans was 
stolen from the consumer credit reporting agency Equifax.12  Given the 
increasing threat of cyber-attacks and data breaches, individuals have sought 
to bring class action suits to hold the companies who released their data 
accountable for their failure to protect the information.  These litigants often 
allege, among other things, that the company that experienced the data 
breach failed to comply with state data breach notification laws and state 
 
 6  Riley, supra note 4. 
 7  See Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also Jane 
E. Willis & Anne E. Johnson, Certification of a National Class Under State Law: Is Electronic 
Arts a Trend or an Outlier?, BLOOMBERG L. REP. (Mar. 1, 2011), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2011/03/certification-of-a-national-class-
under-state-law-is-electronic-arts-a-trend-or-an-outlier.aspx. 
 8  Nate Lord, The History of Data Breaches, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-breaches. 
 9  Allison Ross, 11 Data Breaches that Stung US Consumers, BANKRATE (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/us-data-breaches-1.aspx#slide=1. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Kaya Yurieff, Equifax Data Breach: What You Need to Know, CNN (Sept. 10, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/08/technology/equifax-hack-qa/. 
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consumer protection laws.13  Under the Spokeo standard, however, failure to 
comply with state data breach laws may not be sufficient to allege injury-in-
fact to obtain standing to sue.  This is especially true if courts do not find that 
post-breach claims are harmful enough under a recent standard set forth in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, which requires that injury be 
“certainly impending.”14  Given the nature of data breaches and the type of 
injury that is typically suffered after an incident occurs, this Comment argues 
that Spokeo should not bar litigation where failure to comply with data 
breach laws is alleged as a standalone claim, because it is not merely a “bare 
procedural violation,”15 and failure to comply causes real harm. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of cases leading to Spokeo 
and the test for determining that standing has been established.  Part III 
addresses the nature of the injury that individuals tend to experience after a 
data breach occurs, and why the issue presents a unique challenge for courts 
when determining standing.  Part IV discusses the purpose of private right of 
action provisions in state data breach laws, and how state legislators intended 
to create a right in these statutes.  Part V analyzes how the harm that flows 
from the violation of a data breach statute is similar to tort liability.  Part VI 
discusses the current circuit split post-Spokeo regarding whether private right 
of action provisions can confer Article III standing, and why the issue should 
be resolved in favor of upholding statutory standing in the data breach 
context. 
II. THE WINDING PATH TO SPOKEO AND THE CURRENT TEST FOR 
STANDING 
In the 1992 case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court 
first tackled the question of whether Congress could confer standing.16  In 
the majority opinion, Justice Scalia suggested that in order for a private right 
of action provision to create an injury-in-fact, the Constitution requires a 
certain type of personal injury, akin to those at common law, for standing.17  
“This decision is believed to have invalidated a large number of statutes in 
which Congress has attempted to use the ‘citizen-suit’ device as a 
mechanism for controlling unlawfully inadequate enforcement of the law.”18  
Justices Kennedy and Souter in their Lujan concurrence, however, stated that 
 
 13  Al Saikali, The Target Data Breach Lawsuits: Why Every Company Should Care, 
DATA SECURITY L. J. (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.datasecuritylawjournal.com/2013/12/30/ 
the-target-data-breach-lawsuits-why-every-company-should-care/. 
 14  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 411 (2013). 
 15  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016).   
 16  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 17  Id. 
 18  Sunstein, supra note 3, at 165. 
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congressionally enacted citizen standing provisions may be constitutional as 
long as they are specific about the nexus between the injury and the class of 
citizens authorized to bring suit under the law.19  Lujan is thus believed to 
have rejected the use of private cause of action provisions in circumstances 
that are deemed too far removed from any personal injury to the plaintiff, but 
the case left open the question of whether such provisions may be 
enforceable to confer standing when the individual(s) challenging the 
statutory violation suffered some type of harm as a result of the violation. 
In the time between the Lujan decision in 1992 and the Spokeo decision 
in 2016, the issue of federal statutory standing without “actual injury” had 
been decided inconsistently among the federal circuit courts.  The Sixth 
Circuit, for instance, held in the 2009 case of Beaudry v. TeleCheck Services, 
Inc.20 that a plaintiff could bring an action under the FCRA without showing 
actual harm.21  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit heard the case of Charvat v. 
Mutual First Federal Credit Union,22 where the plaintiff alleged the 
violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act without demonstrating actual 
injury.23  On the other hand, the Second Circuit denied standing in the 2009 
case of Kendall v. Employees Retirement Plan of Avon Products,24 and the 
Fourth Circuit later declined to hear the case of David v. Alphin,25 holding 
that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring claims alleging the violation of 
ERISA without showing actual injury.26 
In the Court’s decision in Spokeo v. Robins, in which the plaintiff 
alleged a violation of the FCRA, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff 
did not have standing unless he suffered “concrete” and “particularized” 
harm in light of the defendant’s conduct in violation of the FCRA.27  
Although the Court denied standing to the plaintiff in Spokeo for “bare 
procedural violations” of federal statutes, without more,28 it did not close the 
door entirely to plaintiffs seeking to bring suit based on a statutory 
violation.29  The Court set forth a test that courts may consider in future cases 
 
 19  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579. 
 20  579 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 21  David J. Lender, Eric S. Hochstandy & Gregory Silbert, Supreme Court to Decide 
Whether Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring Class Action Lawsuits Without Proof of Actual 
Injury, LEXOLOGY (July 6, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b595d8b7 
-17b8-4624-8eef-1a53bdc23ea5. 
 22  725 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 23  Lender, Hochstandy & Silbert, supra note 21. 
 24  561 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 25  704 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 26  Lender, Hochstandy & Silbert, supra note 21. 
 27  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016). 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
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to evaluate whether the violation of a statute establishes concrete injury.30  
“First . . . it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has 
a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as 
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts,”31 and 
“[s]econd . . . whether Congress created a procedural or substantive right in 
the statute at issue.”32 
Since Spokeo, federal courts have determined the existence of an 
injury-in-fact on a case-by-case basis when the litigants claim that a federal 
statute has been violated.33  In addition, recent federal circuit court decisions 
have addressed a litigant’s standing to bring claims under state law in federal 
court, and whether state statutory private right of action provisions can 
confer standing (though federal provisions presumably cannot if they are 
divorced from actual injury or harm).34  Given the fact that state statutes 
largely dictate how a holder of information must react when a data breach 
occurs, it is possible that the application of Spokeo to state statutory claims 
will be decided by the Supreme Court in the years to come. 
III. THE HARM THAT FLOWS FROM DATA BREACHES AND HOW COURTS 
INTERPRET THAT HARM 
To meet the requirements for injury-in-fact to obtain Article III 
standing, plaintiffs must show that they have experienced an injury that is 
imminent and not “too speculative,”35 and that the injury suffered was 
“concrete” and “particularized.”36  Courts have struggled with data breach 
harm because, by their nature, the harms are “intangible, risk-oriented, and 
diffuse,”37 and “[t]hese characteristics are areas that have been particularly 
vexing for courts.”38  The reality of the world of data breaches is that harm 
can be recognized many years in the future when data is used long after it 
 
 30  Id. 
 31  Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-cv-04062, 2016 WL 5339806, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
23, 2016). 
 32  Id. 
 33  Simon A. Fleischmann, P. Russell Perdew & Chethan G. Shetty, Spokeo v. Robins: 
Supreme Court Rejects Article III Standing Based Solely on Statutory Violation, LOCKE LORD 
(May 16, 2016), http://www.lockelord.com/newsandevents/publications/2016/05/~/media/7 
A16BC949D064067A55198B548FDCD00.ashx. 
 34  Ronnie Solomon, Post-Spokeo, Standing Challenges Remain Unpredictable, LAW360 
(Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/854898/post-spokeo-standing-challenges-
remain-unpredictable. 
 35  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). 
 36  Id. 
 37  Daniel Solove, When Do Data Breaches Cause Harm?, TEACH PRIVACY: PRIVACY & 
SECURITY BLOG (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.teachprivacy.com/when-do-data-breaches-
cause-harm/. 
 38  Id. 
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has been obtained.  Therefore, the issue of harm is different for plaintiffs in 
this context than for plaintiffs who bring suit solely based on statutory 
violations that are completely separate from any personal injury that they 
have experienced at the time.  Accordingly, the Spokeo holding should not 
bar plaintiffs from bringing suit to challenge the violation of state data breach 
laws simply because the violation has not yet “harmed” them in the more 
commonly understood sense of the word. 
As many experts in the field of data security have noted, the harm that 
flows from a data breach takes place largely in the future, as opposed to the 
present.  Breaches “open the door for total identity theft,” says Robb Reck, 
Chief Information Security Officer at Ping Identity,39 and the data that is 
compromised during these incidents “will be used for years” according to 
Avivah Litan, a security analyst.40  “Data theft poses an indefinite threat of 
future harm, as birthdate, full name and social security number remain a 
skeleton key of identity in many systems.”41  In addition to the risk of hackers 
using individuals’ data in the future, breaches cause other types of damages 
to individuals who are impacted, as “[m]any are worried about doing the 
digital-era equivalent of constantly looking over their shoulder, waiting for 
someone to appropriate their identity, or dredge up some intimate, haunting 
secret they thought was long buried.”42 
State and federal legislatures and executive branches have also 
acknowledged the nature of the harm that individuals may experience after 
their data has been breached over the years.  As the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has noted, “[p]eople whose identities have been stolen 
can spend months or years—and thousands of dollars—cleaning up the mess 
the thieves have made of a good name and credit record.”43  The FTC also 
notes that “victims of identity theft may lose job opportunities, be refused 
for loans, and even get arrested for crimes they didn’t commit.  Humiliation, 
anger, and frustration are among the feelings victims experience.”44  As 
discussed during the enactment of New Hampshire House Bill 1660 in 2006, 
one of the first data breach notification laws in the country, “[m]ost victims 
 
 39  Adam Shell, Equifax Data Breach Could Create Lifelong Identity Theft Threat, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 9, 2017, 10:08 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/09/ 
equifax-data-breach-could-create-life-long-identity-theft-threat/646765001/. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Farai Chideya, Data Theft Today Poses Indefinite Threat of “Future Harm”, THE 
INTERCEPT (June 12, 2015, 12:26 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/06/12/data-breach-
threat-of-future-harm/. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Take Charge: Fighting Back Against Identity Theft, MYCOLLEGEMONEYPLAN 1 
(2006), http://www.mycollegemoneyplan.org/sites/default/files/documents/Take%20Charge 
%20Fighting%20Back%20Against%20ID%20Theft.pdf. 
 44  Id. 
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don’t find out what has happened until long afterward, when they’re called 
by a collection agency or turned down for a loan.”45 
Since the harm from a data breach is more likely to occur in the future, 
however, courts have grappled with whether litigants whose data has been 
compromised meet the requirements for standing.  The most high-profile 
data breach cases are typically filed in federal court as class action suits and 
are often settled by the parties.  For example, in the wake of the Anthem data 
breach, “[m]ore than 100 data breach class action lawsuits were filed . . . 
alleging [that] Anthem failed to adequately safeguard the personal 
information of subscribers and failed to adequately notify those whose 
personal information was compromised” in accordance with state data 
breach laws.46  The Anthem cases were ultimately consolidated and settled, 
and the company paid $115 million to approximately 78 million class 
members.47  Similarly, settlements for class actions filed against Home 
Depot and Target after the companies experienced data breaches were 
approved in 201648 and 2015,49 respectively, and the companies each paid 
tens of millions of dollars to the plaintiffs. 
When suing a company after a data breach has occurred, plaintiffs bring 
many different types of claims.  In the United States, companies that 
experience large breaches typically face class action lawsuits,50 and 
“common claims in such lawsuits are that the company violated state unfair 
business practices laws, breached a contract, was negligent, or is subject to 
liability for a privacy tort.”51  Plaintiffs have also sought to assert claims 
based on federal laws in the wake of a data breach.52  Faced with these 
numerous cases in recent years, courts have ruled differently regarding the 
likelihood of future harm after a data breach, and whether that harm was 
 
 45  H.B. 06-2049, 1st Sess., at 59 (N.H. 2005). 
 46  Anne Bucher, Judge Orders Gov’t to Produce Docs in Anthem Data Breach Class 
Action, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Feb. 24, 2017), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-
settlements/lawsuit-news/499111-judge-orders-govt-produce-docs-anthem-data-breach-
class-action/. 
 47  Bodweya Tweh, Anthem Agrees to $115 Million Settlement of Data Breach Lawsuit, 
FOX BUS. (June 23, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/06/23/anthem-agrees-
to-115-million-settlement-data-breach-lawsuit.html. 
 48  Tara Seals, Home Depot to Pay $27.25m in Latest Data Breach Settlement, INFO 
SECURITY MAG. (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/home-depot-
to-pay-2725m/. 
 49  Samantha Masunaga, Target Will Pay $18.5 Million in Settlement with States Over 
2013 Data Breach, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2017, 3:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business 
/la-fi-target-credit-settlement-20170523-story.html. 
 50  Ffion Flockhart, Steve Tenai & Andrew L. Hoffman, Civil Litigation Risks Following 
Data Breaches, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (June 2015), https://www.financierworldwide.com/ 
civil-litigation-risks-following-data-breaches/#.WbvwD2NpLY4. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
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sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. 
The first significant case dealing with standing in the data breach 
context was Krottner v. Starbucks, where the court held that the increased 
threat of theft of personal data on a stolen laptop did confer standing.53  
Following Krottner, however, the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Clapper 
v. Amnesty International introduced a higher standard for assessing potential 
harm, providing that a possible future injury that was “certainly impending” 
may suffice as an injury-in-fact.54  Following Clapper, many courts have 
declined to confer standing to individuals whose data was compromised, 
finding that the future harm alleged was too speculative.55  This 
unwillingness to confer standing is not uniform, however, and some courts 
have allowed cases to proceed when the harm alleged is simply that the 
plaintiff’s data was compromised, or that the plaintiff’s injuries are of the 
type that most experience in the aftermath of a data breach.  For example, in 
the Target data breach litigation in a Minnesota federal court, Judge 
Magnuson found that the plaintiffs had sufficient injuries for standing 
purposes because they suffered costs “including unlawful charges, restricted 
or blocked access to bank accounts, inability to pay other bills and late 
payment charges or new card fees.”56  Despite Target’s attempts to argue that 
plaintiffs must allege a more concrete injury, like the closure of their bank 
accounts, Magnuson stated that these arguments “set a too-high standard for 
Plaintiffs to meet at the motion-to-dismiss stage.”57  In addition, the Seventh 
Circuit and Third Circuit courts upheld the assertion of harm and granted 
standing to individuals whose data had been breached in the Neiman 
Marcus58 and Horizon59 data breach cases, respectively. 
It appears, then, that courts may be becoming more familiar with how 
injury manifests in the context of large data breaches, and that judges may 
be increasingly receptive to the arguments that individuals impacted by a 
 
 53  Krottner v. Starbucks, 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010); Stephen E. Embry, Data 
Breach Litigation: The Sky Is Falling or a Failure of Proof?, CLASS COUNS. BLOG (Aug. 14, 
2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/data-breach-litigation-sky-falling-failure-proof-
stephen-embry/. 
 54  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 408–10 (2013). 
 55  Embry, supra note 53. 
 56  Embry, supra note 53; see also In re Target Corp. Customer Data Breach Sec. Litig., 
64 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (D. Minn 2014). 
 57  Kaleigh Simmons, Everything You Need to Know About the Target Data Breach 
Lawsuits, RIPPLESHOT (Feb. 4, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://info.rippleshot.com/blog/everything-
you-need-to-know-about-the-target-data-breach-lawsuits. 
 58  Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015); John K. 
Higgins, Consumers Gain More Power to Seek Data Breach Damages, E-COM. TIMES (Aug. 
21, 2017), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/84747.html. 
 59  In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639–40 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
ELLIOT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2018  3:21 PM 
2018] COMMENT 241 
data breach will suffer harm that is “certainly impending” under the Clapper 
standard.  “Many courts seem to recognize the suggestion raised in the 
Neiman Marcus case that the entire reason the hackers are trying to steal the 
personal information is to try to accomplish an identity theft, and that sooner 
or later hackers with access to the information will try.”60  For instance, 
“[t]he D.C. Circuit recently embraced the premise that the risk of future harm 
can be enough to meet the Spokeo standing bar in a data breach case 
involving health insurer CareFirst.”61  This decision “deepen[ed] a circuit 
split that’s been fueled in part by judges’ growing familiarity with how such 
intrusions play out.”62  The ever-growing number of data breach occurrences 
has also placed pressure on the judiciary to find solutions and remedies for 
those who fear what might happen to them after their private, personal data 
has been compromised.63  Given that courts have decided differently 
regarding the underlying claim of harm suffered from a data breach and 
whether that is sufficient to confer standing under the Clapper standard, it is 
all the more important that courts recognize that claims under private right 
of action provisions in state data breach laws provide a way into court, and 
are not barred as procedural violations under the Spokeo standard. 
An understanding of how harm occurs after a data breach is slowly 
reaching the federal courts.  When drafting state data breach laws, however, 
many legislators and regulators arguably already understood the harm that 
could take place and therefore inserted provisions to allow individuals whose 
data is compromised to file suit. 
IV. THE PURPOSE OF STATE DATA BREACH LAWS AND PRIVATE RIGHT OF 
ACTION PROVISIONS 
Legislative private right of action provisions grant private actors the 
right to sue if another private actor violates the law in which the provision 
appears.64  Generally, the purpose of private right of action or citizen suit 
provisions in legislation historically has been to ensure that regulated entities 
comply with the law as set forth by the legislature by allowing a private party 
 
 60  Kevin LaCroix, Deepening Circuit Split on Data Breach Suit Standing, D&O DIARY 
(Aug. 6, 2017), http://www.dandodiary.com/2017/08/articles/cyber-liability/deepening-
circuit-split-data-breach-suit-standing/. 
 61  Allison Grande, Data Breach Suits Find Easier Path with DC Circ. Ruling, LAW360 
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.law360.com/insurance/articles/951179/data-breach-suits-find-
easier-path-with-dc-circ-ruling. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Embry, supra note 53. 
 64  Daniel Edelson, What Is an Implied Private Right of Action?, USLAWESSENTIALS, 
http://uslawessentials.com/20141116what-is-an-implied-private-right-of-action/ (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2018). 
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to “enforce a regulatory standard.”65  “With a number of devices, including 
the citizen suit, Congress hoped to overcome administrative laxity and 
unenthusiasm, and also to counteract the relatively weak political influence 
of beneficiaries.”66  In addition, “[p]romoting the purpose of a statute through 
citizen initiative is an important policy goal behind a private right of 
action.”67  In the absence of a private right of action, the Attorney General or 
another appropriate state agency typically oversees the enforcement of state 
statutes.68  State legislators have included private right of action provisions 
to allow private citizens impacted by a statutory violation to police 
compliance with the law by bringing suit. 
Since California’s enactment of the country’s first data breach 
notification bill in 2003,69 all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have passed laws that require companies 
that retain an individual’s personal information to disclose when that 
information has been breached.70  While no state law is identical, there are 
many provisions that address similar issues in the bills that have been 
enacted.  “Security breach laws typically have provisions regarding who 
must comply with the law (e.g., businesses, data/information brokers, 
government entities, etc).”71  The laws also frequently include “definitions 
of ‘personal information’ (e.g., name combined with SSN, drivers license or 
state ID, account numbers, etc.);72 what constitutes a breach (e.g., 
unauthorized acquisition of data);73 requirements for notice (e.g., timing or 
method of notice, who must be notified);74 and exemptions (e.g., for 
 
 65  William H. Timbers & David A. Wirth, Private Rights of Action and Judicial Review 
in Federal Environmental Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 403, 404 n.6 (1985). 
 66  Sunstein, supra note 3, at 193 (discussing the view that prior to Lujan, the unanimous 
view of lower courts had been that a legislative grant of citizen standing was constitutional 
even without a showing of injury-in-fact). 
 67  Timbers & Wirth, supra note 65. 
 68  Kymberly Kochis, Veronica Wayner & Alex Fuchs, Understanding and Defending 
State Consumer Protection Actions, SUTHERLAND 1, 14 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://us.eversheds-
sutherland.com/portalresource/UnderstandingandDefendingStateConsumerProtectionAction
s.pdf. 
 69  Ryan J. Udell, Shari G. Pressman & Wasim S. Rahman, Data Breach—What You Need 
to Know Now: California’s Data Security Breach Notification Law, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP 
(Oct. 7, 2011), https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-California-Data-
Security-Breach-Law.html. 
 70  Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-
breach-notification-laws. 
aspx. (last updated Sept. 29, 2018).  
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. 
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encrypted information).”75  Some laws also include safe harbor provisions 
that allow entities to forego notification of a breach in certain 
circumstances.76 
In addition to these provisions, fifteen states specifically provide for a 
private right of action in their data breach laws, which allow a suit to be 
brought if the notification statutes are not complied with.77  Further, a “short 
but growing list of states . . . require entities to provide some form of credit 
monitoring services after a breach.”78  These additional provisions suggest 
that state legislators understand the harm that can come from a data breach, 
and that an individual must be notified when a breach takes place and 
provided with options to help them address and mitigate their resulting 
injuries.  This intent is clear in many cases, including when reviewing the 
history of the first data breach law in the United States, California Senate 
Bill 1386.  According to its author, the bill was “intended to help consumers 
protect their financial security by requiring any agency or business that 
maintains a computerized data system that contains personal information to 
disclose any breach of the security of the system immediately . . . .”79  The 
notification would be required “if the information disclosed could be used to 
commit identity theft.”80  In addition, the enacted law states that “[a] 
consumer injured by a violation of the provisions of this bill would have the 
right to bring civil suit and recover damages.”81  At the time the legislation 
was being considered, supporters of the bill argued that the bill was 
necessary because consumers needed to know about a breach of their 
information security so that they could take effective steps to prevent identity 
theft.82  The passage of this legislation, which required disclosure of data 
breaches and included a private right of action provision,83 undoubtedly 
 
 75  Id. 
 76  See Jennifer J. Hennessey et al., State Data Breach Notification Laws, FOLEY & 
LARDNER LLP (May 21, 2018), https://www.foley.com/state-data-breach-notification-laws/. 
 77  Stephen Embry, State Data Breach Notification Laws Just Got Crazier, A.B.A. (May 
2016), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/2016/may-2016/state-data-breach 
-notification-laws-just-got-crazier.html. 
 78  Caleb Skeath, Delaware Amends Data Breach Notification Law to Require Credit 
Monitoring, Attorney General Notification, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/delaware-amends-data-breach-notification-law-to-
require-credit-monitoring-attorney. 
 79  An Act to Amend, Renumber, and Add Section 1798.82 of, and to Add Section 1798.29 
to, the Civil Code, Relating to Personal Information: Hearing on S.B. 1386 Before the 
Assembly Judiciary Comm., 2002 Leg., Sess. 1386 (Cal. 2002).  
 80  Id. 
 81  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b) (West 2010). 
 82  An Act to Amend, Renumber, and Add Section 1798.82 of, and to Add Section 1798.29 
to, the Civil Code, Relating to Personal Information: Hearing on S.B. 1386 Before the 
Assembly Judiciary Comm., supra note 79. 
 83  CIV. § 1798.84(b). 
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helped citizens to avoid harm because they learned about numerous instances 
of theft of their private data, which they likely would not have known about 
but for the law being in place.  “Because of SB 1386, we learned in 2005 that 
ChoicePoint—a company most Americans had never heard of—had 
somehow sold detailed credit histories on more than 163,000 consumers 
directly to identity thieves.”84  “And in 2007, we learned that identity thieves 
had broken into the computer systems of the discount retailer TJX and stole[] 
more than 45 million credit-card numbers.”85  Failure to disclose a breach or 
comply with state data breach notification laws can clearly harm individuals 
who would not otherwise be aware of the fact that their data had been 
exposed and could not take the proper precautions afterward to protect 
themselves from misuse of their data. 
Not long after California, the Washington legislature also enacted a 
data breach notification statute, Senate Bill 6043, which included a private 
right of action providing that “[a]ny customer injured by a violation of this 
section may institute a civil action to recover damages.”86  As these bills 
moved through state legislatures, members noted that “[v]ictims of identity 
theft must act quickly to minimize the damage; therefore, expeditious 
notification of possible misuse of a person’s personal information is 
imperative.”87 It appears from the various legislative histories surrounding 
data breach laws that state legislatures enacted data breach notification bills 
to address the harm that occurs to consumers when they are not made aware 
of the fact that their data has been stolen.  In a letter from New Hampshire 
Governor John Lynch to Representative Sheila Francoeur regarding the 
state’s data breach notification law, which includes a private right of action 
provision, Governor Lynch noted that “[b]y requiring prompt disclosure of 
security breaches, our citizens will be in a better position to react in a timely 
manner to potential threats against the misuse of their identities.”88  Recently, 
the California legislature reinforced the importance of including a private 
right of action in data breach notification laws by retaining the provision 
allowing individuals to bring suit and providing for a specified range of 
statutory damages in its amended and updated 2018 version of the law.89  It 
 
 84  Simson Garfinkel, Privacy Requires Security, Not Abstinence, MIT TECH. REV. (June 
23, 2009), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/414015/privacy-requires-security-not-
abstinence/. 
 85  Id. 
 86  An Act Relating to Breaches of Security That Compromise Personal Information, S.B. 
6043, 2005 Leg., Sess. 1, 3 (Wash. 2005). 
 87  An Act to Amend, Renumber, and Add Section 1798.82 of, and to Add Section 1798.29 
to, the Civil Code, Relating to Personal Information: Hearing on S.B. 1386 Before the 
Assembly Judiciary Comm., supra note 79. 
 88  Letter from John Lynch, Governor, N.H., to Sheila Francoeur, Representative, N.H. 
(Jan. 10, 2006) (on file with the New Hampshire General Court). 
 89  Assemb. B. 375, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
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is clear that in California, Washington, and New Hampshire, legislators 
understand the harm that could occur to citizens when the notification law is 
not complied with, and this is likely why they included private right of action 
provisions to allow these individuals to bring suit based on this harm. 
A recent occurrence highlights the importance of allowing individuals 
to bring suit after their data has been breached.  As a result of the Equifax 
breach, “the private financial and personal details of as many as 143 million 
Americans have been exposed to hackers.”90  A class action lawsuit, Allen et 
al. v. Equifax, was filed, and among the claims is the company’s delay in 
informing consumers about the breach, “thereby preventing them from 
taking steps to minimize the damage.”91  The allegations charged “include 
violations of . . . state consumer protection laws as well as rules regarding 
deceptive practices and data breaches, all of which are recounted in the 323-
page filing.”92  The recent Equifax breach, and resulting reaction from both 
state and federal legislators throughout the country, reinforces the notion that 
legislators intend to hold companies accountable for failure to notify citizens 
of a breach of their data.  After the breach, Senator Robert Menendez of New 
Jersey stated that it is “outrageous that Equifax waited more than a month to 
inform consumers about this hack.”93  During a congressional hearing, 
Representative Markwayne Mullin of Oklahoma told the former CEO of 
Equifax that the company’s response “should have been like a fire alarm on 
the wall, ready at a moment’s notice to be pulled.”94  There have also been 
numerous efforts over the years to enact one federal data breach standard, as 
opposed to the patchwork of fifty state laws, including the Personal Data 
Notification and Protection Act.95  “Under this proposed legislation, Equifax 
would have had to disclose its breach within 30 days—not the six weeks it 
took—to the FTC and the Department of Homeland Security.”96  The 
 
 90  Bryce Covert, Get Rid of Equifax, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/opinion/get-rid-of-equifax.html. 
 91  Kenneth R. Harney, Data Breach at Equifax Prompts a National Class-Action Suit, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/data-breach-at-
equifax-prompts-a-national-class-action-suit/2017/11/20/28654778-ce19-11e7-a1a3-
0d1e45a6de3d_story.html?utm_campaign=0618182381-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_11_27&utm_medium=email&utm_source=I.I.I&utm_term=.2
91c07336ab4. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Press Release, Sen. Bob Menendez, What You Should Know About Equifax Data 
Breach (Sept. 14, 2017). 
 94  Jim Puzzanghera, ‘I Don’t Think We Can Pass a Law That Fixes Stupid’: Lawmakers 
Berate Equifax Ex-CEO, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
equifax-hearing-ceo-20171003-story.html. 
 95  Christopher Mims, Should the U.S. Require Companies to Report Breaches?, FOX 
BUS. (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/09/24/should-u-s-require-
companies-to-report-breaches.html. 
 96  Id. 
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concern about timely notification of data breaches is one of the main 
motivators for enacting, and ensuring compliance with, state laws.  Last year, 
“Equifax Inc. learned about [the] major breach of its computer systems in 
March—almost five months before the date it [had] publicly disclosed,” 
according to Bloomberg News.97  “New questions about Equifax’s timeline 
are also likely to become central to the crush of lawsuits being filed against 
the Atlanta-based company.”98  Equifax’s failure to disclose this first breach 
caused clear harm to those whose data was later acquired in the second 
breach and those who were not given the opportunity to adequately protect 
themselves in light of the first threat.  Individuals could have been spared 
harm if Equifax had conducted an investigation of the first breach that was 
“sufficiently thorough” and not “closed too soon,” thereby requiring them to 
notify more individuals of the incident.99  The purpose of requiring 
companies to disclose breaches in accordance with state law is to ensure that 
individuals are not harmed by the failure to be informed of a breach.  The 
Equifax issue highlights how this harm can occur. 
Even in states that do not have a private right of action provision in their 
data breach laws, courts impliedly recognize that there is a legislative intent 
behind those that do.  For instance, in dismissing a Pennsylvania class action 
suit, Judge R. Stanton Wettick, Jr. stated that the court refused to interfere 
with the legislature’s direction in this area of the law where they had not 
provided a private right of action to bring suit after a data breach occurred.100  
Further, even post-Spokeo, recent federal court decisions have affirmed the 
idea that private rights of action imply a legislative intent to confer standing 
with regard to privacy issues.  In discussing the FCRA, the court hearing the 
case of the recent Horizon data breach stated that “[Congress] created a 
private right of action to enforce the provisions of FCRA . . . which clearly 
illustrates that Congress believed that the violation of FCRA causes a 
concrete harm to consumers.”101  The court found legislative intent implied 
from the language of the FCRA, which provides for a capped amount of 
 
 97  Michael Riley, Anita Sharpe & Jordan Robertson, Equifax Suffered a Hack Almost 
Five Months Earlier Than the Date It Disclosed, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-18/equifax-is-said-to-suffer-a-hack 
earlier-than-the-datedisclosed?utm_source=I.I.I.+Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=c90b 
b06d51EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_09_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_092139a76
a-c90bb06d51-122523861. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Pennsylvania State Court Rejects Data Breach Claims, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (June 
10, 2015), https://dataprivacy.foxrothschild.com/2015/06/articles/data-protection-law-
compliance/pennsylvania-state-court-rejects-data-breach-claims/. 
 101  See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639 (3d Cir. 
2017).   
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statutory damages following willful violations of the act.102  A court would 
then likely find an even clearer legislative acknowledgment of the harm that 
results from a violation of a data breach law like the one in Washington, 
which includes stronger language than the FCRA to allow an individual to 
bring a lawsuit for violations of the act.103 
The failure to learn of a data breach is harmful because hackers will 
employ an individual’s stolen personal information at some point in the 
future.  The question is not if they will do so, but when.  As the Seventh 
Circuit recently explained, there is a reasonable likelihood that hackers will 
use a plaintiff’s information to commit identity theft or credit card fraud,104 
and their criminal motive can be presumed.105  As Professor Daniel Solove 
notes, “[w]hy would more than 90% of the states pass data-breach 
notification laws in the past decade if breaches did not cause harm?”106  The 
same is true for the harm that arises from failing to comply with those 
notification laws.  State legislatures included private right of action 
provisions in these laws to allow individuals to sue a company for failure to 
comply with their statutory duty to notify them of a breach, and to recover 
for the harm that occurred as a result.  The Supreme Court’s holding in 
Spokeo should, therefore, be interpreted to allow individuals to bring suit 
once their data has been breached, consistent with state legislators’ intent in 
enacting data breach laws with these provisions.  Failure to notify impacted 
individuals of a breach in compliance with state law is injurious in and of 
itself, and the right to bring suit is necessary to ensure that individuals hold 
companies accountable in disclosing a breach and allowing them to protect 
themselves from additional harm.  Failure to comply with state data breach 
laws is meant to be challenged in court when the legislation explicitly 
includes a private right of action provision. 
V. THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE HARM THAT OCCURS FROM A DATA 
BREACH AND TORT LIABILITY 
In the Lujan case, Justice Scalia suggested that an injury-in-fact 
sufficient to confer standing may be found if the alleged injury suffered is 
 
 102  David N. Anthony & Julie D. Hoffmeister, FCRA May Be a Dead End for Data Breach 
Plaintiffs, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/751612/fcra-may-be-a-
dead-end-for-data-breach-plaintiffs. 
 103  See An Act Relating to Breaches of Security That Compromise Personal Information, 
S.B. 6043, 2005 Leg., Sess. 1, 3 (Wash. 2005). 
 104  The Seventh Circuit Sides with Plaintiffs in Data Breach Litigation, FOX ROTHSCHILD 
LLP (July 24, 2015), https://dataprivacy.foxrothschild.com/2015/07/articles/data-protection-
law-compliance/the-seventh-circuit-sides-with-plaintiffs-in-data-breach-litigation/. 
 105  Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach 
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 779 (2018). 
 106  Solove, supra note 37.  
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akin to one recognized at common law.107  Therefore, it could be argued that 
further evidence of a legislative intent to confer standing for the violation of 
state data breach laws is the fact that there appears to be a tort-like duty 
imposed on holders of information that, under the common law, would allow 
a litigant to obtain standing if breached. 
There is evidence of legislative intent to impose a tort-like duty on 
holders of individuals’ sensitive information in that a number of state data 
breach laws also allow an individual impacted by a violation to bring suit 
under the state’s consumer protection laws.108  Alaska,109 Maryland,110 
Tennessee,111 Texas,112 and most recently, South Dakota,113 each have 
enacted these types of provisions.  One of the purposes that states had in 
enacting these types of consumer protection laws with private rights of action 
was to help carry out common-law liability since the Federal Trade 
Commission Act had no such provision.114  This Act was enacted by 
Congress in the early twentieth century to provide stronger remedies to 
consumers who brought claims regarding business torts.115  Given the law’s 
shortcomings, however, most business torts are now brought under state 
consumer protection statutes.116  Therefore, linking the violation of a state 
data breach law by a business to a private right of action under consumer 
protection statutes is evidence of a state legislature’s intent to treat data 
breach cases similarly to tort cases. 
In fact, the tort-like duty that state data breach laws impose on 
companies has also been expressed by federal representatives, in addition to 
state legislators.  In recent communications from members of Congress, they 
have spoken about “hold[ing] Equifax accountable for failing to safeguard 
our personal information.”117  At the recent hearing held by Congress, 
Representative Greg Walden of Oregon told the former CEO of Equifax that 
 
 107  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 108  Data Breach Charts, BAKERHOSTETLER (July 2018), https://www.bakerlaw.com/files 
/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/DataBreachCharts.pdf. 
 109  ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2015). 
 110  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504 (West 2010). 
 111  TENN. CODE ANN. §47-18-2107 (2005). 
 112  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 521.053 (West 2009). 
 113  South Dakota Enacts Breach Notification Law, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP: 
PRIVACY & INFORMATION SECURITY L. BLOG (Mar. 23, 2018), 
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2018/03/23/south-dakota-enacts-breach-notification-
law/.  
 114  Michael C. Gilleran, The Rise of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act Claims, 
A.B.A. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts 
/articles/fall2011-unfair-deceptive-trade-practice-act-claims.html. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. 
 117  What You Should Know About Equifax Data Breach, supra note 93. 
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the company’s failure to protect individuals’ data from being hacked, and its 
delay in notifying individuals after it occurred, was “like the guards at Fort 
Knox forgot to lock the doors and failed to notice the thieves were emptying 
the vaults.”118 
Plaintiffs often bring negligence claims when suing a company after a 
data breach occurs, and courts have found those claims viable at the motion 
to dismiss phase when connected to the violation of a state consumer 
protection statute.  The aftermath of the Target data breach provides a recent 
example of a court imposing a duty on a company that retains consumer 
information.119  In a case that was filed after that breach, the United States 
District Court for the District of Minnesota concluded that the consumers’ 
allegations that Target knew that the data was sensitive, and therefore was 
susceptible to being hacked, was plausible enough to establish a duty on 
Target to disclose the incident.120  As a result of this finding, most of the 
class members’ claims under state consumer protection laws were sustained 
in that case.121  “[T]he existence of the MPSCA bolstered [the] ruling that 
the financial institutions adequately pleaded a duty of care under general 
negligence law . . . .”122  This was because the court felt that the statute stood 
for “Minnesota’s policy of punishing companies that do not secure 
consumers’ credit- and debit-card information.”123  In addition, recently, two 
Oregon residents filed a class action suit against Equifax, claiming that the 
company negligently failed to protect their personal information or to use 
adequate safeguards to protect consumers’ personal information.124  Given 
the magnitude of the Equifax breach, and the continuing occurrence of other 
data breaches, courts are likely to see similar cases filed on the basis of tort-
related theories. 
Recent federal court decisions have also identified the close 
relationship between harm that is suffered by failure to comply with data 
breach laws and torts.  In the case of In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy 
Litigation, the Third Circuit held that “Congress has long provided plaintiffs 
 
 118  Puzzanghera, supra note 94. 
 119  Maggie Lassack, Wendell Bartnick & Joseph Molosky, Consumer and Financial 
Instutition Class Actions Survive Motions to Dismiss in Target Data Breach Litigation, 
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.wsgrdataadvisor.com/ 
2015/02/consumer-and-financial-institution-class-actions-survive-motions-to-dismiss-in-
target-data-breach-litigation/#_ftnref5. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Lassack, Wendell & Molosky, supra note 119. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Maxine Bernstein, Two Oregon Residents File Class Action Lawsuit Against Equifax, 
Alleging Negligence, OREGONIAN (Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/ 
index.ssf/2017/09/two_oregon_residents_file_clas.html. 
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with the right to seek redress for unauthorized disclosure of information that, 
in Congress’s judgment, ought to remain private.”125  Further, finding 
standing based on an alleged violation of the FCRA, in the recent case of 
Perrill v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas stated that “[t]he common law has long 
recognized a right to personal privacy.”126  Given this reasoning, one could 
conclude that failure to comply with data breach laws is akin to the tort of 
public disclosure of private facts, which allows individuals to sue for the 
unauthorized release of their private information. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lujan did note that statutes cannot create 
standing in certain circumstances, where the new legal right was not one that 
was recognized at common law.127  He was careful, however, to note that the 
decision was not based on a case where concrete injury had been suffered by 
many persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations.128  Arguably, then, 
Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Lujan, while discrediting private right of action 
provisions that are too attenuated from actual injury, actually supports the 
notion that these provisions in state data breach laws should confer standing.  
This is because the injury in data breach scenarios, as in mass torts, is often 
suffered by many persons.  Even in the Spokeo case, which also failed to 
confer standing based on a private right of action provision, Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence noted the difference between a statute that creates a private right 
of action based simply on a violation of private rights, versus those that the 
defendant owed to the public collectively.129  Given the pervasive nature of 
data breaches and their impact on society at large, it would be hard to deny 
that not only do information holders owe a duty to the individuals whose 
information they possess, but also to the public at large to safeguard the 
information that they hold to prevent data hacking.  An entity that fails to 
protect the data of many individuals violates the duty of reasonable care that 
it owes to customers and to members of the public, and therefore, even under 
the strict Spokeo test for standing, a plaintiff who sues a company after 
experiencing a data breach claims an “intangible harm [that] has a close 
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a 
basis for a lawsuit.”130  That harm is most akin to tort liability. 
 
 
 
 125  In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 126  Perrill v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 205 F. Supp. 3d 869, 873 (W.D. Tex. 2016) 
(quoting Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 646 (N.D. W. Va. 2016)).  
 127  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992). 
 128  Id. 
 129  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 130  Id. at 1549. 
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Finally, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan provides additional 
support for state statutory standing provisions in data breach notification 
laws.  Justice Kennedy noted that in creating private rights of action via 
statute, the legislature “must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to 
vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.”131  
In most data breach laws with private right of action provisions, only those 
“injured” by a violation of the statute can bring suit.132  Therefore, those 
legislatures have adequately related the class of persons entitled to bring suit 
by ensuring that only those whose data was compromised, or only those who 
the data holder breached their duty to, can challenge the violation of that 
statute. 
These cases and decisions reinforce the view that the risk of data 
breaches imposes tort-like liability on entities that maintain personally 
identifiable information for consumers, and that state legislators recognized 
the harm and injury that can occur for failure to comply with a data breach 
law when drafting private rights of action. 
VI. THE CURRENT SPLIT POST-SPOKEO REGARDING WHETHER STATE LAW 
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION PROVISIONS CAN CONFER ARTICLE III 
STANDING, AND WHY THE ISSUE SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF 
UPHOLDING STATUTORY STANDING IN THE DATA BREACH CONTEXT 
Since the Spokeo decision in 2016, a number of federal court decisions 
have addressed whether state statutory private rights of action can confer 
standing.133  This issue has resulted in a circuit split in which some courts 
have found standing based on the violation of a state law after a data breach 
occurred, and some have not.134  Even before the Court decided Spokeo, the 
Ninth Circuit in 2001 reasoned that “the violation of a state-created legal 
right . . . can create interests that support standing in federal courts.”135  The 
court noted that, practically, without conferring standing in this scenario, 
“there would not be Article III standing in most diversity cases, including 
run-of-the-mill contract and property disputes.”136  There is also well-
established historical support for conferring standing when a plaintiff alleges 
the violation of a state statute.  In the 1988 case of FMC Corp. v. Boesky, the 
Seventh Circuit considered the question of whether the “invasion of a 
 
 131  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 132  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 133  Ronnie Solomon, Post-Spokeo, Standing Challenges Remain Unpredictable, LAW360 
(Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/854898/post-spokeo-standing-challenges-
remain-unpredictable. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 684 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 136  Id. 
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recognized state-law right in itself satisf[ies] Article III’s injury requirement, 
even though an injury separate and apart from the actual invasion is difficult 
to identify.”137  Though they declined to answer the question directly, the 
judges cited to a 1975 Supreme Court case in which the Justices explained 
that “actual or threatened injury required by Art[icle] III may exist solely by 
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing.”138 
Even in light of this past practice, however, certain federal courts have 
unnecessarily denied litigants standing based upon their claim that a state 
data breach law was violated.  In the case of Khan v. Children’s National 
Health System, the Fourth Circuit recently held that individuals who brought 
a class action lawsuit after a data breach occurred did not have standing 
under the Spokeo standard.139  The court reasoned that “[h]ere, where Khan 
alleges violations of state law, she advances no authority for the proposition 
that a state legislature or court, through a state statute or cause of action, can 
manufacture Article III standing for a litigant who has not suffered a concrete 
injury.”140  The Ninth Circuit, however, consistent with the position that it 
took in the 2001 case of Cantrell v. City of Long Beach,141 has continued to 
provide that “state statutes can create interests that support standing in 
federal courts,” even post-Spokeo.142  In the 2016 case of Matera v. Google, 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
interpreted the Spokeo decision as setting forth three factors that “grant . . . 
persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”143  Those factors 
are: “(1) the provision of a private right of action; (2) the availability of 
statutory damages; and (3) the substantive nature of the statutory right.”144  
In Matera, the court upheld the plaintiff’s right to sue Google based on the 
violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act.145  Clearly, then, at least 
some federal courts understand the Spokeo decision as having validated the 
ability of state statutes to confer standing to litigants in federal court who 
allege the violation of the law; an ability that existed long before the Supreme 
Court decided the Spokeo case.  This lends credence to the argument that 
individuals should be permitted to bring a case against companies who failed 
to comply with data breach notification laws when those laws establish a 
 
 137  FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981, 993 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 138  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). 
 139  Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524 (D. Md. 2016). 
 140  Id. at 534. 
 141  241 F.3d 674, 684 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 142  Matera v. Google, Inc., No. 15-cv-04062, 2016 WL 5339806, at *14, n.2 (N.D. Cal. 
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 144  Id. (emphasis added). 
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private right of action. 
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, federal judges in the Southern District 
of New York have recently granted standing to plaintiffs claiming the 
violation of a state mortgage-notification statute.146  In the 2016 case of 
Bellino v. JP Morgan Chase, the court reasoned that “[u]ltimately, both 
history and the judgment of the New York State legislature indicate an intent 
to elevate the harm associated with a mortgagee’s delayed filing . . . to a 
concrete injury.”147  In addition, in the recent case of Jaffe v. Bank of 
America, which also analyzed standing for the violation of the mortgage 
notification law, the Southern District of New York held that “[t]he State 
Legislature has provided a private right of action and a heuristic for 
quantifying damages, possibly in recognition of [] the concreteness of this 
harm.”148  The Jaffe court further stated that “[t]he types of harm the statutes 
protect against are real.”149  In both Bellino and Jaffe, the courts evaluated a 
claim of failure to comply with state law that requires banks to file timely 
mortgage satisfaction information, and both found that the legislature 
intended this failure to be a harm that could be remedied in court.150  This 
scenario is strikingly similar to the data breach context, where failure to 
timely notify an individual of a breach of their data can cause real, concrete 
harm.  In addition, a number of other recent federal court decisions have 
upheld standing for the alleged violation of privacy and data security laws, 
including Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers, where the court found 
that the failure to comply with the Michigan Preservation of Personal Privacy 
Act was sufficient to allow the case to proceed.151 
Long before Spokeo, federal courts recognized state legislatures’ ability 
to confer standing to plaintiffs who allege the violation of a law which allows 
them to bring suit,152 and after Spokeo, many federal courts continue to allow 
parties to claim the violation of a state law with a private right of action 
provision in order to allege injury-in-fact sufficient to obtain standing.153  
Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning154 and recent decisions made 
by judges in the Southern District of New York,155 the current circuit split 
 
 146  Bellino v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 209 F. Supp. 3d 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Jaffe 
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 149  Id. 
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should be resolved in favor of understanding the Spokeo decision as having 
affirmed the right of state legislatures to confer standing via their statutes, 
and not as barring their ability to do so. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether private right of action provisions in state data 
breach laws confer standing to plaintiffs whose information has been 
acquired may not be resolved definitively in the near future, as a number of 
laws allow individuals “injured” under the statute to file suit,156 which may 
create ambiguity.  Therefore, federal courts may continue to assess on a case-
by-case basis whether class members were sufficiently harmed by the 
violation of the statute, such that Article III injury-in-fact was attained.  If a 
lawsuit based on a state data breach law was heard by the Supreme Court 
and remanded to determine injury, as the Spokeo case was remanded to the 
Ninth Circuit who found sufficient injury,157 however, the decisions on 
remand about whether the risk of harm experienced by those impacted by a 
data breach is injurious enough to confer standing may provide guidance to 
future litigants.158  In addition, in the Seventh Circuit, the recent holding in 
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC may allow individuals who have 
suffered a breach of their data to bring a claim based solely on the violation 
of a state data breach law, because the court found that the future risk of theft 
and fraud suffices for standing purposes.159  Adding to the uncertainty is the 
fact that “Spokeo only sets limits on federal-court jurisdiction; state-court 
jurisdiction is not limited by Article III.”160  “Thus, a case dismissed from 
federal court under Spokeo could be re-filed in state court, although some 
(but not all) state courts find federal Article III cases instructive when 
interpreting limits on state-court subject-matter jurisdiction.”161 
Nonetheless, in light of the way that harm occurs after a data breach, 
the purpose of private right of action provisions, and the tort-like duty 
imposed on entities that hold individuals’ personal data, it is clear that state 
legislators intended for individuals affected by a data breach to be able to 
bring suit when they drafted these laws.  Therefore, the Spokeo decision 
should not bar class action suits alleging the violation of a state data breach 
law that includes a private right of action, if such a violation occurs and 
individuals are not timely warned of the acquisition of their personal, 
sensitive information. 
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